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1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have expanded rapidly in both developed and developing
countries since the early 1990s. Mining and energy industries have played a substantial role in
this expansion. Activity during this period was exemplified by Rio Tinto’s US $43bn purchase
of Alcan in the beginning of 2008. This was quickly surpassed by BHP Billiton’s failed $147.4
billion takeover of Rio Tinto the same year. Had it succeeded it would have been the second
largest takeover in corporate history. Since 2009, the global economic recession has seen the
value of global M&A fall substantially, from a record high in 2007 of $3.16 trillion, to $1.49
trillion in 2010 (Dealogic (2010)).
Economists have identified a number of motives for why firms engage in M&A activity:
to achieve economies of scope and scale, generate new revenues, gain access to new markets,
increase managerial specialization and power, engage in cross-selling, and expand geograph-
ical distribution. However, Dunning and Lundan (2008) note that for resource industries, in
particular, M&A also provide a means to diversify and acquire new resources. The increasing
substitution of M&A for greenfield investment1 in the mining industry since the 1990s certainly
suggests that CEOs have followed this strategy. Since the early 1990s, M&A in the mining
industry have outpaced greenfield investments. M&A have enabled mining firms to meet the
rising demand for metals and minerals in the face of declining supplies, rising exploration costs,
and growing political instability in resource rich countries. M&A have become important ve-
hicles whereby mining companies can diversify, both across countries and commodities (PwC
2010).
While such horizontal/vertical models of M&A activity can provide an explanation for why
companies engage in M&A, they do not explain why companies choose to engage in M&A in
one country versus another. One possible explanation may be found in what collectively can
be called the ”governance infrastructure literature”. This rapidly growing body of literature
suggests that one strong driver of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the nature and quality of a
country’s political, economic, and legal policies and institutions. To this list of characteristics,
we would also include the quality of a country’s environmental regime.
The mining industry, in particular, is heavily polluting. The huge costs involved in setting
up even a small operation mean that it is comparatively ”non-footloose”. Hence governance
1Greenfield investments are those that start a new venture from scratch in a foreign country.
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factors, particularly environmental, may figure more prominently in this industry than in others.
Indeed, qualitative evidence from CEOs in the mining industry indicates that issues of social
and environmental sustainability are beginning to figure prominently in their M&A decisions
(Fonseca et al. 2011; PwC 2007).
Some economists argue that there are economic advantages for companies to locate in coun-
tries with less stringent environmental regulations since they can avoid the higher costs of en-
vironmental compliance they face at home. This thinking is embodied in the pollution haven
hypothesis (e.g. see Fullerton (2006)). In contrast, others argue that environmental factors
play no role in investment decisions, i.e. there are no pollution havens. According to this lit-
erature, the stringency of a country’s environmental regulations does not matter. Firms will
adopt similar or even higher standards elsewhere, for reasons such as cost-efficiency and cost-
effectiveness, ”inoculation” against future environmental disasters, avoidance of unnecessary
legal costs, pressure from shareholders, and the need to cultivate a green public image. It is also
not in the best interests of companies to invest in countries with weak environmental standards
because the damage to the company’s image from simply being in such countries outweighs any
economic gains of locating there irrespective of the actual standard of company environmental
performance. Such studies jointly comprise what is known as the pollution halo hypothesis
literature (e.g. see Eskeland and Harrison (2003); Zarsky et al. (1999)).
Using a hitherto unexamined data set of all completed M&A worldwide in the mining in-
dustry from 1994-2006, this study will seek to shed light on these competing positions. To
this end, it uses a multinomial logit model to measure the role of key environmental and other
governance infrastructure variables that could affect mining investments (e.g. economic and
financial risk and governance) – not just in the countries that are the target of the M&A but also
in the acquiring companies themselves.
Specifically, our study seeks to shed light on two interrelated questions: Is the environmental
stringency of an object country a key factor driving M&A in the mining industry? Second, does
the stringency of the environmental regime of the buyer country itself have any significant
influence over its choice of object country? Answering these questions will help us to assess
the competing claims of the literature: If we find a significant negative association between
the acquiring and object country in respect to the stringency of their environmental regimes,
then it is reasonable to argue that this is evidence for the claim that firms are indeed moving
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to countries with lower levels of environmental stringency (i.e. pollution havens exist in the
mining industry). However, if we find significant positive associations, then this suggests that
buyers are driven to seek out other countries due to their similar environmental regime. In the
case of non significant associations, differences in environmental regimes do not play any role
in their decision to locate there and consequently pollution havens would not exist in the mining
industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the empirical
context of the study. Section 3 provides a review of relevant papers, focusing on the limitations
of the M&A literature that this study attempts to address. Section 4 discusses the data set,
econometric methods and empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 An Overview of Mergers & Acquisitions in the Mining Industry Since 1995
The time period broadly encompassed by this study is distinguished by three distinct waves of
M&A activity in the global mining industry: The first wave occurred between 1995 and 1998;
the second between 1999-2001 and the third started in 2005, ending abruptly with the global
financial crisis in 2008. These mergers have taken place at different points in the price cycle:
The mid-1990s and 2005 M&A waves intensified at a price peak for metals and minerals. The
second wave occurred during a price trough (Humphreys (2006)). From wave to wave, the total
value of mergers and acquisitions in the industry rose steadily, reaching record levels in 2007.
The rise in M&A activity saw a concomitant fall in the total value spent on exploration during
these periods. Exploration costs remained well below the total value of M&A (PwC (2008)).
Looking at the first two waves in detail, we note that during the early 1980s to the early
2000s, real term prices for metals and minerals declined steadily due to slumping demand and
persistent problems of oversupply. Institutional investors viewed the industry as waning and
unprofitable. By 2001 the combined value of quoted mining and metal companies had fallen
to a mere US$ 3 billion, 1% of all global equity investment (Humphreys (2006)). In response
to these adverse trends, industry executives used M&A to consolidate their financial position.
M&A provided a means of reducing overhead costs, capturing economies of scale and scope,
and allocating capital more efficiently in difficult financial times. M&A were also necessary
to ensure competitiveness and diversify geographically in an increasingly globalized business
world (Humphreys (2006); PwC (2008)).
The third M&A wave was driven by sharp increases in the demand for metals and minerals,
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fuelled largely by the industrial economies of Asia, especially China. Unlike previous waves,
this 3rd wave was distinguished by its focus on expansion rather than consolidation. CEOs
became increasingly optimistic about the long-term prospects for the industry. M&A provided
them with a means of maximizing production and supply, acquiring new technologies and ex-
pertise, diversifying assets, and generating new production synergies (PwC (2005)). Another
key driver in M&A activity during this period was the dwindling number of viable greenfield
sites worldwide. This physical scarcity was exacerbated by increasing costs of new project
development and growing government demands for a greater share of profits in the form of
taxes and royalties. For large, well-resourced companies like Rio Tinto, industry consolidation
through M&A also provided the infrastructure and technical skills for increasingly difficult to
access ore bodies (PwC (2008)). As a consequence of these trends, the real value of M&A
activity in this period rose to a historical high of US$207 billion in 2007.
The global financial crisis brought an end to this third wave in 2008. Although M&A have
always been a feature of the mining industry, the market capitalization of the top 40 mining
companies – an indicator of the health of the industry as a whole – declined by 62% in 2009
(PwC (2009)). For the most part, only those companies – mainly large, cash-rich Chinese firms
looking to secure long-term supplies – were in a position to buy. Most companies focused
on consolidation rather than expansion. Consequently, the total value of M&A fell to $153.4
billion in 2008 and to a further US $77.1 billion in 2009.
3 Literature Review
3.1 Relevant Literature: FDI & Governance Infrastructure Studies
A voluminous literature exists on the determinants of FDI flows. Recent papers have attempted
to systematically analyze non-economic – in particular – governance-related, determinants of
FDI flows. Many have found a significant association between FDI flows and the quality of
a country’s democratic institutions, the corruptibility and efficiency/transparency of its institu-
tions and depth of its political and civil freedoms. Kolstad and Villinger (2008), for example,
find that both institutional quality and democratic accountability are more important than gen-
eral investment risk or political stability in the financial and other service industries measured
in their study. Kolstad and Tondel (2002) also find a positive association between democratic
accountability and FDI per capita. In their study of 53 developing countries from 1982 to 1995,
115
Review of Economic Analysis 7 (2015) 111–134
Li and Resnick (2002) find that democratic rights are associated with better protection of prop-
erty rights, which is an important driver in FDI investment. However, increases in democracy
may actually reduce FDI flows. Harms and Ursprung (2002) find that political risk indices and
the institutional environment do not affect FDI flows per capita.
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) find a positive association between FDI flows and measures
of governance infrastructure, such as policies promoting domestic and international competi-
tion, the degree of political openness and transparency of legal and regulatory regimes, and the
efficient delivery of government services. Most notable for our study, they find no evidence
to suggest that FDI is attracted to developing economies with lower environmental conditions
(measured in terms of an index of environmental quality). Rather, they find only very weak
evidence at most to suggest that the higher the index of environmental sustainability, the lower
the capital outflows.
3.2 Environmental Motivations underlying FDI Flows: Pollution Haven Hypothesis
Studies
Economic theory predicts that firms will weigh a number of factors when making investment
location decisions, including the environmental stringency of the object country (Fullerton
(2006)). Specifically, the pollution haven hypothesis argues that highly pollution intensive in-
dustries will seek out environmentally lax countries, which tend to be also poorer, in order to
avoid the higher costs of environmental compliance at home. According to this hypothesis,
the growing liberalization of world trade has led to environmental considerations being at the
forefront of decisions about where investments should be made.
Empirical studies have found mixed support for the pollution haven hypothesis. Among
the studies that focus on FDI outflows from countries other than the USA, evidence for a
role for environmental stringency is much weaker than for either comparable plant location
or trade/FDI flow studies for the USA. One such study, by Eskeland and Harrison (2003), finds
that abatement costs are not significant determinants of the distribution of foreign investment
among manufacturing industries within Mexico, Venezuela, Morocco, and Cote d’Ivoire. For-
eign ownership appears to be quite significantly associated with lower energy use, the study’s
proxy for pollution intensity. Similarly, Smarzynska and Wei (2004) find weak support at best
for the possibility that environmental laxity may lead to more foreign investment. Mani et al.
(1996) find no evidence that plant location decisions are affected by state level of environmental
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enforcement in India. Dean et al. (2009) find evidence that environmental regulations have no
impact on joint equity projects between partner firms in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan and
Chinese regions in highly polluting industries. Moreover, ventures originating from the OECD
countries were not driven by low environmental levies, regardless of their water pollution in-
tensity. Tole and Koop (2010) find some evidence that the birth of new copper mines is related
to higher levels of country environmental stringency. However, other factors such as political
stability and low levels of corruption appear to be stronger determinants.
In contrast, Cole & Elliot (2005) find that the capital requirements of US sectors is a key
determinant of FDI flows, as is the level of pollution abatement costs in the US in FDI flows to
Brazil and Mexico, indicating a pollution haven effect for these countries. Kellenberg (2009)
finds that as much as 8.6% of the growth in outbound US multinational affiliate value can be
explained by a decline in the relative stringency and enforcement of environmental policies.
Similarly, Ederington et al. (2005) find that environmental regulations have a significant effect
on trade flows from rich to poor countries, and within industries that face high abatement costs,
which also happen to be geographically the least mobile.
3.3 Drawbacks of Existing Studies
Most existing studies on country environmental determinants of FDI flows use aggregate mea-
sures, which include both greenfield and M&A investments. Very few focus on M&A alone.
This lacuna is all the more surprising given the growing prominence of M&A in pollution inten-
sive industries and the different motivations underlying such activity in comparison to greenfield
investments. Another drawback is that the overwhelming majority of these studies use data on
FDI flows aggregated across industries. However, it is obvious that industries differ widely in
their structure and operations, not differentiable in aggregate data. At the same time, the moti-
vations for investing in M&A may be different for heavily polluting industries such as mining.
The vast majority of studies focus on service and manufacturing industries; however, these do
not face geographical resource restrictions to the same degree as mining nor do they typically
require such a large investment. Thus, the kind of institutions, policies and regulations that may
determine M&A need not be the same at different industries. In particular, it is reasonable to as-
sume that environmental stringency will be a more important consideration in heavily polluting
industries such as mining.
Moreover, pooling rich, medium-income and very poor countries together may also obscure
117
Review of Economic Analysis 7 (2015) 111–134
important differences in the data. For instance, rich countries do tend to have more stringent
environmental regimes and quality, but aggregating data may obscure this fundamental differ-
ence. Doing so may also obscure possible threshold effects that could ”tip the balance” toward
investment in a country (e.g. a minimum level of environmental stringency). Moreover, only
a few studies examine the characteristics of buyers and object countries to determine whether
the buyer’s home country may influence M&A activity. This is especially the case in respect to
environmental standards and quality. Only one such study includes an appropriate control mea-
sure for environmental regime (e.g. Globerman and Shapiro (2002)), but in the overall context
of a systematic analysis of other governance-related determinants of FDI flows.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
Our data set contains information on the value paid and ore characteristics of all completed
M&A in the mining industry worldwide between 1994 and 2006. We combine this with a panel
data on buyer country and object country characteristics, measured between 1994 and 2006. In
our dataset, there are mines which were bought by more than one buyer. We use the majority
investment firm’s head office location as the buyer country. In most cases buyers all came
from the same country. The data were derived from a variety of publicly available (e.g. World
Bank, ISO) and a proprietary dataset produced for the mining industry (RMG (2007)). Table 1
includes a summary of the data with acronyms and measures.
Dependent Variable. We have two equations and therefore two dependent variables. The
dependent variable in the mixed logit model is the country where the investor decides to buy a
mine. The other dependent variable is the selling price for the mine after adjusting for differ-
ences in ore value. We obtain it as the residuals of a regression of the log of the selling price on
a set of 60 dummies representing different types of ore. We have 1719 observations, which is
the number of all completed M&A in the mining industry worldwide between 1994 and 2006.
The investors came from 54 different countries and mines were bought in 99 different countries.
Independent Variables: a) Environmental: Since our main focus of the analysis is on the role
of environmental stringency in M&A, we include a number of variables designed to capture the
level and quality of environmental stringency and compliance. Most multi-country FDI stud-
ies use international treaty-based indicators to measure regulatory stringency (e.g. Smarzynska
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Table 1: Description of Variables
Variable Acronym Measure Part of:
Value of M&A VALUE
US$ (mill) paid for object mine after
adjusting for differences in ore value
Vi jt
GDP per capita GDP
Real GDP per capita
constant US$, in logs: ln(x+0.01)
x jt, zit
Political
Stability
POLSTAB
Durability of
political regime, in logs: ln(x+0.01)
x jt, zit
Regulatory
Quality
REG
Efficacy of government
regulations for business
x jt, zit
Sulphur dioxide
emissons
SO2
Total SO2 emissions millons tons per unit
of GDP as proportion of US emissions P
per unit of GD, in logs: ln(x+0.01)
x jt, zit
Openness OPEN
% share GDP
in trade, in logs: ln(x+0.01)
x jt, zit
Investment INV
Investment
share of GDP, in logs: ln(x+0.01)
x jt, zit
Environmental
performance
ENVP
Index of environmental
performance, in logs: ln(x+0.01)
x jt, zit
ISO 14001
Certification
ISO
Total ISO 14001
certifications, in logs: ln(x+0.01)
x jt, zit
Share world
output
PROP
share of world output
mineral/metal of object country mine
in logs: ln(x+0.01)
x jt
Location of
Head Office
LOC
Head office in same
country; 1=Yes; 0=No
Ii j
Common
Language
LANG
Share common language
1=Yes; 0=No
Li j
constant term CONS A vector of ones
correlation CORR
Constructed regressor whose
coefficient is −ρi in equation (4).
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and Wei (2004)). Given the absence of complete and comparable cross-country data on environ-
mental regulations for any industry, we also use proxy variables for environmental stringency.
On the reasonable assumption that the quality of a country’s environment reflects in large part
the stringency of its regulations and level of compliance, we use three proxy measures that also
reflect the state of a country’s environmental performance and concern. This is in contrast to
the common practice of using proxies measuring intentional goals (e.g. non-binding interna-
tional agreements (e.g. anti-whaling treaties). The latter are not always directly applicable to a
country’s environmental stringency or have little relevance to the control of industrial pollution.
One variable measures a pollutant that is of direct importance to the mining industry. This
variable, SO2, is a measure of each country’s sulphur dioxide production per unit of GDP over
that of the US. We express national emissions in terms of US emissions in order to counteract
any environmental Kuznets curve impacts of growing emissions over time due to falling or
rising real GDP or population. Data for SO2 emissions were derived from Stern (2005), which
also provides details on its measurement and sources. Real US GDP data used to construct the
measure were derived from Heston et al. (2009).
We would argue that SO2 emissions provide a very good proxy for the stringency of a coun-
try’s regulations: First, it is an industrial pollutant regulated throughout the world and com-
monly measured in standard units. Second, as countries grow and become richer, it is one of the
first air pollutants subject to regulation. Even the poorest countries have regulations to control
SO2 emissions. Steep initial reductions can usually be achieved by regulators in poor countries
by forcing firms to make cheap technological investments. Hence to a greater degree than many
other pollutants (e.g. CO2 and NOX emissions) high SO2 emissions indicate an environmental
regulatory regime is weak and/or compliance is not being monitored properly. Second, SO2
emissions are of significant importance to the mining industry. It produces substantial amounts
of SO2, and its control imposes large costs on mining firms in terms of compliance with strin-
gent regulation in richer countries. This variable is also one of the very few environmental
measures for which there is a comprehensive dataset covering all the countries in our sample
and period of study.
Another environmental variable, designated by the acronym ISO, is designed to tap the ex-
tent to which industries and businesses in each country are concerned with improving their en-
vironmental performance. This variable is a measure of the total number of ISO 14001 certified
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companies in a country. It is derived from yearly reports from the ISO (International Organi-
zation for Standardization). Although a voluntary and non-governmental standard, the 14001
standard is internationally recognized. Certification in the standard entails that firms adopt an
environmental management system (EMS) which is similar in its goals and application. Thus,
unlike many mandatory standards, it can be compared meaningfully across countries. The fact
that some countries have a large number of certifications suggests a sensitivity to environmental
pollution that is lacking in other countries. Not surprisingly, the largest number of certified
firms are in the richest countries of the world.
Our other environmental measure is the Environmental Sustainability Index (ENVP), an an-
nually produced composite index that measures 21 different elements of country environmental
sustainability such as: natural resource endowments, past and present pollution levels, envi-
ronmental management efforts and global commons efforts between 1999 and 2005 (by Yale
University’s Center for Environmental Law and Policy and Columbia University’s Center for
International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN 2006)). Measures for years before
1999 are assigned the 1999 value and for 2006 the 2005 value (although the data used to con-
struct the index comes from various years before the year of publication). Since this ideally
measures government commitment to sustainability through a range of policies, it provides a
good overall proxy for the level of environmental stringency in a country. The higher the value
of the index, the greater the level of sustainability.
b) Political, Regulatory & Legal Institutions. This data comes from a variety of sources and
taps different dimensions of the quality of a country’s political and legal institutions. The first
measures country political stability (POLSTAB). Stability is measured as.durability of a regime,
i.e. how long the regime has been in power, based on the number of years since the last national
regime transition. While the risks posed by political instability may be lower in democratic
regimes (e.g. Busse and Hefeker (2005)), authoritarian regimes may provide higher returns to
investors (Oneal (1994)) because they can provide predictability and hard and fast rules for a
firm committed to a country over the long-term. Such firms may even seek to lobby authoritarian
governments as a risk management strategy, a route not always possible in democratic regimes.
Data were derived from the Center for International Development and Conflict Management
(CIDCM 2007).
Our second variable, REG, measures the quality of a country’s regulations (including envi-
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ronmental). Derived from the World Bank, it measures the ability of governments to formulate
and implement policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
c) Economic & Financial Variables. Unlike manufacturing and other industries, mining is
an extractive activity largely carried out in isolated enclaves for the export rather than domestic
market. Hence rather than measure domestic market size, as is common in FDI studies, we
measure the percentage of each object country’s share of world exports of the main metal or
mineral in the M&A (PROP). The data were derived from RMG 2007. Income level of the
country is measured in terms of GDP per capita (GDP) in constant 1996 US dollars and were
derived from Heston et al. (2009).
In addition, we also include two variables designed to measure the openness of countries to
foreign investment and trade: investment share of real GDP (INV) and percentage of GDP in
total trade (OPEN). Both variables are from Heston et al. (2009) and are measured in constant
1996 prices. The first variable was obtained by dividing investment share by real GDP plus
exports minus imports. The latter variable was measured as exports plus imports divided by
real GDP per capita in constant 1996 US prices.
d) Other Variables. The study also controls for two variables common in FDI studies. The
first of these proxies cultural closeness of the buyer and object country, measured by a dummy
variable where 1= common language between countries and 0=no common language. Another
proximity variable measures M&A activity in respect to organizational proximity, i.e. the loca-
tion of object relative to the buyer country’s head office: 1 indicates if the M&A is in the same
country as the buyer country’s head office and 0 otherwise.2
4.2 Empirical Methods
We model the choice of country using a random parameter logit model (McFadden and Train
2000). We assume that each of the mines in the dataset was bought by a different investor so that
2We initially included a corporate tax rate variable comprised from a number of sources, that had missing
values for some countries in our sample. Its inclusion/exclusion did not qualitatively make any difference
to the results obtained. Similarly, a mining risk variable data measuring financial risk for the industry
was only available for two periods of our study, and we did not include it because its interpretation was
difficult as it included many types of risks.
Another variable, often found in gravity models of location/FDI studies, is distance, usually from the FDI
source capital city to object country capital city. We did not include such a proximity variable in this
study due to the fact that it has little meaning for an extractive industry that operates in enclaves often in
remote areas.
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each purchase is statistically independent of the others. Each investor i has to choose among Jt
alternatives, where Jt is the number of countries from which a mine can be bought at period t.
Let ci be the home country of investor i. We model the unobserved profitability of investing in
country j for an investor i from country ci in period t as:
p∗i jt = B
p
iI Ici j + B
p
iLLci j + x
′
jtB
p
ix + ε
p
i jt i = 1, ...,Nt j = 1, ..., Jt t = 1, ...,T (1)
where x jt is a vector of country j characteristics at time t, Ii j is a dummy taking value 1 if ci
equals j (i.e. investing at home), Lci j is a dummy taking value 1 if countries ci and j speak
the same language and εpi jt is an error term with extreme value distribution. Each investor will
choose the country j for which p∗i jt is maximum. The set of choices at year t is assumed to be
equal to the set of countries where a mine was sold or bought in year t. The number of choices
at year t is denoted by Jt. The parameter Nt is the number of mines that were sold in year t, such
that adding up Nt over the different years gives the total number of observations:
T∑
t=1
Nt = 1719.
Note that each investor buys one and only one mine, so that we are not modelling the opt-out
option. Instead our model aims to explain the choice of country for an investor who has decided
to buy a mine. Although the errors (εpit j : j = 1, ..., J) are restricted to be independent among
them (with distribution type 1 extreme value, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 505)), the
coefficients (Bpi = (B
p
iI B
p
iL B
p′
ix )
′) are random and vary among investors (Bpi ∼ N(µp,Σp)). As
noted by McFadden and Train (2000) this introduces correlation among the p∗i jt ( j = 1, ..., J) and
allows for a general random utility model. Furthermore, this framework allows each investor
to have different preferences. This is particularly important in this context as investors might
be located in different countries and/or be interested in different types of ore. As explained
below, this framework also allows us to study how the preferences of the investor correlate with
the characteristics of its own country. This is information is crucial to determine whether the
pollution haven hypothesis holds.
Note that the latent variable p∗i jt is not observed. Instead we observe the binary indicator
pi jt, which is equal to one if alternative j was chosen, and 0 otherwise. Thus in the vector
(pi1t, ..., piJtt) only one element is equal to one and all the others are zero. We complete the
model with an equation for Vi jt, which is the value at which the mine was bought after adjusting
for differences in ore value. To obtain this we use the value at which the mine was sold and
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regress its logarithm on a set of 60 dummy variables representing different types of ore. Then
we obtain ln(Vi jt) as the residuals from such regression. Finally we specify ln(Vi jt) as a function
of country characteristics as follows:
ln(Vi jt) = BV0i + B
V
iI Ici j + B
V
iLLci j + x
′
jtB
V
ix + ε
V
i jt (2)
We introduce correlation between εpi jt and ε
V
i jt by assuming that ε
V
i jt = ρiε
p
i jt + ε˜
V
i jt, where (˜ε
V
i jt,
ε
p
i jt) are independent and ε˜
V
i jt ∼ N(0, σ2). We assume in addition that cov(εpi jt, εVikt) = 0 for j , k.
The coefficients (BVi = (B
V
0i B
V
iI B
V
iL B
V′
ix ρi)
′) vary among buyers according to BVi ∼ N (µV ,ΣV ).
Note that Vi jt is only observed whenever pi jt equals one.
In addition to models where (µp, µV ) are constant vectors, we also estimate models where
they are linear functions of the characteristics of the buyer (zi):
µp = Πp
 1·zi

µV = ΠV
 1·zi

where zi are the average characteristics of buyer i:
zi =
1
T
T∑
t=1
zit
and
·
ziis the demeaned version of zi:
·
zi = zi − Σizi
Σi1
Note that because
·
ziis the demeaned version,
·
zi = 0 implies that zi is equal to the average over
countries. Thus, the first column of Πp (or ΠV ) represents the effect of covariates x jt on p∗i jt (or
ln(Vi jt)) for a country of average characteristics. The other columns of Πp (or ΠV ) capture how
that effect changes with the characteristics of buyer countries.
For computational convenience we follow one of the methods proposed in Dubin and Mc-
Fadden (1984). First instead of (2) we write:
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ln(Vit j) = BVi0 + B
V
iI Ici j + B
V
iLLci j + x
′
jtB
V
ix + ρiE(ε
p
i jt |pi jt = 1, Bpi ) + ε˜Vi jt (3)
As shown by Dubin and McFadden (1984)
E(εpi jt |pi jt = 1, Bpi ) = 0.57721 − ln
 exp(BpiI Ici j + BiLLci j + x′jtBpix)∑Jt
s=1 exp(B
p
iI Ici s + BiLLci s + x
′
stB
p
ix)

so that (3) can be written as:
ln(Vi jt) = BVi0 + B
V
iI Ici j + B
V
iLLci j + x
′
jtB
V
ix
− ρi ln(
exp(BpiI Ici j + BiLLci j + x
′
jtB
p
ix)∑J
s=1 exp(B
p
iI Ici s + BiLLci s + x
′
stB
p
ix)
) + ε˜Vi jt (4)
The advantage of writing the equations in this way is that ε˜Vi jt and ε
p
i jt are independent and
therefore we can estimate equations (1) and (4) separately. We first run an MCMC algorithm
for equation (1) to obtain draws from the posterior of (BpiI , BiL, B
p
ix). We then estimate equa-
tion (4) by drawing from the conditional distribution of (BVi0, B
V
iI , B
V
iL, B
V
ix) given the values of
(BpiI , BiL, B
p
ix) obtained in the previous estimation. Although the joint estimation of equations
(1) and (4) could in theory give slightly more efficient estimates, the procedure that we fol-
low gives valid estimates and credible intervals. In this sense the approach is analogous to the
well-known Heckman two step estimation of the sample selection model (Cameron and Trivedi
(2005, p. 550)). Details on the prior specification and computational algorithm that we use are
given in the appendix.
4.3 Results
Table 2 shows the results of estimating equations (1) and (4) when (µp, µV ) are not allowed to
depend on buyers’ covariates. We focus only on coefficients whose sign is well determined at
the 95% or 99% level. By this we mean that the posterior 95% or 99% credible interval, respec-
tively, did not contain the value 0. The factors whose sign is well determined for the location
equation (1) are LOC, SO2 at 1% and GDP, OPEN at 95%. The coefficient of LOC is posi-
tive, indicating that buyer countries are more likely to invest at home, other things being equal.
SO2 is the only environmental variable whose sign is well determined, and the positive sign
indicates that buyer countries prefer to invest in countries with more SO2 emissions. However,
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Table 2: Posterior estimates of µp (location eq. (1)) and µV (value eq. (4)). Posterior median of
each coefficient.
Location Value
CONS 2.82
LOC
∗∗∗
2.56 -0.1
GDP
∗∗
0.17 0.05
POLSTAB 0.01 0.02
REG -0.02 0.21
SO2
∗∗∗
0.13 -0.12
OPEN
∗∗−0.22 ∗∗−0.43
INV -0.02 0.06
ENVP 0.02 -0.16
ISO 0.03 -0.02
PROP 0.04
∗∗
0.12
LANG 0.14 0.1
CORR -0.12
Notes: The symbols ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate that the sign of the corresponding coefficient is
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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before we can conclude whether this is evidence for the pollution haven hypothesis we need
to look at the model that incorporates buyers’ covariates. As we will see, the positive sign of
SO2 is explained by the fact that buyer countries with greater levels of SO2 emissions at home
are more likely to invest at home. Hence it is not evidence for the pollution haven hypothesis.
With respect to macroeconomic variables, a greater GDP per capita and less openness seem to
be characteristics that attract buyer countries. Regarding the value equation, no environmental
factors turn out to have a well determined sign. The only two factors that seem to determine the
amount of money flowing to object countries are OPEN (with negative sign) and PROP (with
positive sign). That is, object countries owning a large percentage of the mineral in question
will attract larger investments as will countries whose GDP depends less on trade.
Although Table 2 gives as an overview of the characteristics of countries attracting mining
investment, in order to investigate the pollution haven hypothesis we need to look at the correla-
tion between buyer/object characteristics as captured in ΠV in the value equation (Table 3) and
Πp in the location one (Table 4). Regarding ΠV we can observe a positive correlation between
the political stability of the buyer country and that of the object country, whose sign is well
determined at the 95% level. That is, buyer countries with high political stability value invest
more money where the political stability is also high. We also observe a negative correlation,
at the 99% level, between the regulatory quality of the buyer country and the SO2 emissions of
the object country. Thus, buyer countries with better regulatory quality will invest less money
in countries where SO2 is high, other things being constant. The other coefficient whose sign is
well determined at the 99% level in Table 3 is that of the coefficient of PROP in the first column
of ΠV . This means that a buyer country with average characteristics invests more money in
object countries that own a large percentage of the mineral in question.
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Table 3: Posterior estimates of ΠV (value eq. (4)). Posterior median of each coefficient.
BUYER
OBJECT CONS GDP POLSTAB REG SO2 OPEN INV ENVP SIO
CONS 1.73 -1.81 1.31 -1.6 -0.47 0.02 -0.63 -1.01
∗
1.37
LOC 0.13 0.05 0.22 0.08 -0.22 0.38 -1.32 -0.13 -0.14
GDP -0.27 -0.25 -0.03 0.24 -0.05 -0.29 0.08
∗
2.00 0
POLSTAB 0.17 -0.36
∗∗
0.23 -0.14 0.07 -0.06 -0.12 -0.39 0.01
REG 0.37 0.13 0.31 0.46 -0.04 -0.12 -0.86 -1.25
∗−0.19
SO2 -0.2 0.11 0.21
∗∗∗−0.81 -0.02 0.04 -0.43 0.49 0.08
OPEN -0.04 0.62 0.44 -0.46 0.14 0.35 -1 -0.59
∗−0.26
INV
∗
0.93 0.25 -0.06 -0.57 0.2 0.53 0.2 -0.78 -0.15
ENVP -0.34 0.91
∗−0.99 0.77 -0.08 -0.04 0.78 -2.96 0.04
ISO -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
∗
0.17 0 0.09 -0.18 0.03 -0.01
PROP
∗∗∗
0.18 -0.18 0.06 0.14
∗−0.07 -0.02 -0.06 0.12 -0.02
LANG -0.37 -0.9 0.29 0.85 0.08 -0.02 -0.63 -1.55 0.04
CORR 0.12 0.35 0.1 -0.01 0.01 0.15 -0.8 -0.19 -0.01
Notes: The symbols ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate that the sign of the corresponding coefficient is
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The column under CONS represents the effect
of object covariates on ln(Vi jt) for a buyer country of average characteristics. The other columns
capture how that effect changes with the characteristics of buyer countries.
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Table 4: Posterior estimates of Πp (location eq. (1)). Posterior median of each coefficient.
BUYER
OBJECT CONS GDP POLSTAB REG SO2 OPEN INV ENVP SIO
LOC
∗∗∗
1.3
∗∗∗
0.96 -0.07
∗∗−0.53 ∗∗∗0.64 0.17 ∗∗∗−1.73 ∗∗∗2.38 ∗∗0.09
GDP 0.08 0.22 -0.04 0.09
∗
0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.29 -0.01
POLSTAB 0.05 0
∗∗
0.09
∗∗∗−0.27 -0.01 0.01 -0.14 0.36 0
REG -0.02 0.05 -0.08 0.17 -0.01 -0.08
∗
0.41 -0.48 -0.04
SO2 0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.12 0.06 -0.1 0.26 -0.36 0.01
OPEN -0.1 -0.11 0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.21 0.03 -0.27 -0.03
INV
∗
0.12 0.06 0.02 -0.15 0.08 -0.2 0.24 0.54 -0.01
ENVP 0 0 -0.01 0.04 0 -0.08 0.08 0.27 -0.02
ISO 0.01 -0.13 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04
∗∗
0.04
PROP 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 -0.07 0.13 0.01
LANG
∗∗∗
0.72
∗
0.38 -0.07 -0.02
∗∗∗
0.32
∗−0.3 ∗∗∗−0.95 0.5 0.05
Notes: The symbols ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate that the sign of the corresponding coefficient is
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The column under CONS represents the effect
of object covariates on p∗i jt for a buyer country of average characteristics. The other columns capture
how that effect changes with the characteristics of buyer countries.
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Finally Table 4 shows estimates of Πp. We find a positive (at the 95% level) correlation
between the political stability of the buyer country and that of the object country: buyer coun-
tries with higher political stability tend to choose object countries where political stability is
also high, other things being constant. Note that we found this correlation to be positive also in
the value equation, so they are not only more likely to choose that location but will also tend
to invest more money in it. With respect to environmental variables, although we find mixed
evidence for those firms that invest at home, firms that invest abroad are looking for coun-
tries with environmental standards similar to their own. We see this in the correlation between
the ISO variable of the buyer country and that of object country, which is positive at the 95%
level. On the other hand, the coefficient of LOC in the location equation is positively correlated
(at 99%) with all 3 environmental variables: SO2, ENVP and ISO. Thus buyer countries are
more likely to invest at home if home environmental performance is high, according to overall
environmental performance (ENVP) and level of voluntary adherence to international environ-
mental standards (ISO), but weak according to SO2 emissions. Although this mixed finding
for domestic investment might be difficult to be interpreted, our main focus is on foreign rather
than home investment. And we would argue that the role of environmental factors in M&A
decisions is best captured through our value rather than location equation, because the former
pertains directly to the size of M&A.
To summarize, on the whole, we find no evidence for the pollution haven hypothesis but do
find some evidence to suggest that: (1) buyer countries with higher regulatory quality (REG)
will invest more in countries with lower SO2 emissions and (2) buyer countries with higher
levels of environmental performance (ISO) are more likely to prefer locations with similar levels
of environmental performance (ISO).
5 Conclusions
This paper has empirically investigated the role that environmental stringency plays in M&A
decisions in the global gold mining industry. Using a unique data set on all completed M&A in
the mining industry between 1994 and 2006, this paper attempted to shed light on the question
of whether pollution havens exist in this highly polluting industry. According to the pollu-
tion haven literature, buyer firms will more likely try to avoid regulatory liabilities of highly
stringent environmental regimes by undertaking M&A in less environmentally stringent places.
Alternatively, firms will be more likely to invest in countries with the same or higher level of
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stringency for a number of reasons (e.g. the desire to ensure cost-effectiveness and efficiency
in operations, avoid potential environmental liabilities and damage to one’s corporate image,
and comply with shareholder demands). Our empirical results suggest that the latter position
may better describe M&A in the global mining industry: Firms do not seem to be attracted
to countries due to their weak environmental standards. If anything, firms in environmentally
cleaner countries tend to invest more money in operations in countries that also have cleaner
environments (and implicitly, higher levels of environmental stringency).
Thus, countries wishing to attract foreign investment in the mining industry should focus on
policies that improve their environmental record. In addition, our analysis found that other gov-
ernance infrastructure factors, namely a country’s attractiveness in terms of its regulatory qual-
ity and political stability, are both important factors in buyers’ investment decisions. Although
not tested in this study, it is reasonable to think that these factors may also play a contributing
role in the level of a country’s environmental stringency. Given the importance of these and
related environmental variables in our study, it is important that countries consider the overall
quality of the governance infrastructure when formulating specific FDI policies.
Appendix
Let s(p) be the dimension of Σp, s(V) the dimension of ΣV and let IW(S , n) denote an inverted
Wishart distribution with n degrees of freedom (Bauwens et al. 1999, p. 305). We chose the
following priors for variance parameters:
Σp ∼ IW(0.1I, s(p) + 1)
ΣV ∼ IW(0.1I, s(V) + 1)
σ2 ∼ IW(0.1, 2)
where I is an identity matrix of appropriate dimension. The prior number of degrees of freedom
is the minimum to ensure that the prior is proper and the prior mean is finite. In models where
(µp, µV ) do not depend on covariates we assume that a priori µp ∼ N(0, 10I) and µV ∼ N(0, 10I).
When (µp, µV ) are functions of covariates we fix priors on Πp and ΠV as vec(Πp) ∼ N(0, 10I)
and vec(ΠV ) ∼ N(0, 10I).
We respect to computational strategy we first estimate the model defined by equation (1)
alone (that is, ignoring the value equation). We do this by using an MCMC algorithm (e.g.
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Koop 2003, p.p. 92-99) defined on 3 block of parameters: Σp, µp (or Πp) and (B
p
1 , ..., B
p
Nb ). The
first two blocks can be generated directly from their conditional posteriors, which are inverted
Wishart and normal, respectively. For each of the vectors Bpi we use a Metropolis-within-Gibbs
step. Instead of drawing Bpi at once we decompose B
p
i into the log of the norm (ln(B
p′
i B
p
i ))
and direction ((Bp′i B
p
i )
−1/2Bpi ) and draw them in turns. The proposal density for each of them
is a symmetric random-walk: a normal for the log of the norm and for the direction a matrix
angular central Gaussian distribution (Chikuse, 2003, p. 40). Another possible strategy, which
we did not follow, is to draw the vector Bpi all at once using a student-t or normal random-walk
proposal density.
Conditional on (Bp1 , ..., B
p
Nb ) we can draw the parameters of equation (4) in 4 blocks: σ
2, ΣV ,
µV (or ΠV ) and (BV1 , ..., B
V
Nb ). Each of them can be drawn directly from its conditional posterior
density (normal or inverted Wishart). We combined 5 independent runs of 60000 iterations each
after a burn-in of 5000 iterations. Each run used different (randomly chosen) starting values and
gave qualitatively similar results, indicating convergence.
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